Variations on the Knapsack Generator

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ENS-PSL

March 1st, at Journées NAC



PRNG



PRNG



PRNG




Table of Contents

1 Definition of the Knapsack Generator

2 Attacks on the Knapsack Generator

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2 Attacks on the Knapsack Generator

Knapsack Problem

Optimization Problem



 $\leq C$



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Knapsack Problem

Optimization Problem





 $\leq C$

 $\omega_3, p_3 \qquad \omega_4, p_4$

Goal: Finding bits *u_i*

$$\sum_{i=1}^{4} u_i \omega_i \leq C$$
 and $\sum_{i=1}^{4} u_i p_i$ maximal

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Subset Sum Problem (SSP)

Guessing Problem







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Guessing Problem



Goal: Finding bits *u_i*

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Formalization

Parameters:

- an integer n
- a vector of weights $\boldsymbol{\omega} = (\omega_0, \dots, \omega_{n-1})$
- a target C
- a modulo M

The goal is finding \mathbf{u} such that

$$\langle \mathbf{u}, \boldsymbol{\omega}
angle = C \mod M$$

Formalization

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
$$\langle \mathbf{u}, \boldsymbol{\omega} \rangle = C \mod M$$


The closer *M* is to 2^n , the harder the problem is. For now $M = 2^n$




$$\mathbf{u} \longrightarrow \overline{\langle \cdot, \boldsymbol{\omega} \rangle \mod M} \longrightarrow s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots$$

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¹Rueppel, R.A., Massey, J.L.: Knapsack as a nonlinear function. In: IEEE Intern. Symp. of Inform. Theory, vol. 46 (1985)

Public	Secret
<i>n</i> and $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$	$\mathbf{u} \in \{0,1\}^n$
$f \in \mathbb{F}_2[X_1,\ldots,X_n]$	$oldsymbol{\omega} \in \{0,\ldots,2^n-1\}^n$

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Intermediate states	
$(u_i)_{i\geq n}$	$u_{n+i} = f(u_i, \ldots, u_{n+i-1})$
$(\mathbf{U}_i)_{0,,m-1}$	$\mathbf{U}_i = (u_i, \ldots u_{n+i-1})$

PublicSecret
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
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$\mathbf{v} = (v_0, \ldots, v_{m-1})$	$oldsymbol{v}_i = \langle oldsymbol{U}_i, \omega angle mod M$
$\mathbf{s} = (s_0, \ldots, s_{m-1})$	$s_i = v_i / / 2^\ell$
$\boldsymbol{\delta} = (\delta_0, \ldots, \delta_{m-1})$	$v_i = 2^\ell s_i + \delta_i, \ \boldsymbol{\delta} _{\infty} \leq 2^\ell$

Table of Contents




2 Attacks on the Knapsack Generator

The main flaw



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The secret is unbalanced.



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For a secret of \sim 1024 bits, the seed (u) is only made of 32 bits.

Layout

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```
ApproxWeights(\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{s}(short)):
???
Return(\omega')
```

Check Consistency $(\mathbf{u}', \boldsymbol{\omega}', \mathbf{s}(long))$: $\mathbf{s}' = PRNG(\mathbf{u}', \boldsymbol{\omega}')$ Return Boolean $(\mathbf{s}' \text{ is close to } \mathbf{s})$

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```
Full Attack(s):

For \mathbf{u}' \in \{0, 1\}^n:

\omega' = \operatorname{ApproxWeights}(\mathbf{u}', \mathbf{s}(short))

If Check Consistency(\mathbf{u}', \omega', \mathbf{s}(long)) = \operatorname{True}

Return (\mathbf{u}', \omega')

End If

End For
```

Norms

• If
$$\mathbf{v} = (v_0, \dots, v_{n-1}), \|\mathbf{v}\|_{\infty} = \max_{i \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}} |v_i|$$

• If M is a matrix, $\|M\|_{\infty} = \max_{\|\mathbf{v}\|_{\infty} = 1} \|\mathbf{v}M\|_{\infty}$
Hence

$$\|\mathbf{v}M\|_{\infty} \leq \|\mathbf{v}\|_{\infty}\|M\|_{\infty}$$

$$U = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{U}_0 \\ \mathbf{U}_1 \\ \dots \\ \mathbf{U}_{m-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

 $^{^2 {\}sf Knellwolf}, {\sf S.}, \&$ Meier, W. (2011). Cryptanalysis of the knapsack generator. FSE 2011

$$U = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{U}_0 \\ \mathbf{U}_1 \\ \dots \\ \mathbf{U}_{m-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

 $\boldsymbol{\omega} \boldsymbol{U} = \mathbf{v} \mod \boldsymbol{M}$ $= 2^{\ell} \mathbf{s} + \boldsymbol{\delta} \mod \boldsymbol{M}$

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
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
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Attack of Knellwolf and Meier²


 $U = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{U}_0 \\ \mathbf{U}_1 \\ \dots \\ \mathbf{U}_n \end{pmatrix}$ $\omega U = \mathbf{v} \mod M$ $=2^{\ell}\mathbf{s}+\boldsymbol{\delta} \mod M$ $\boldsymbol{\omega} = \mathbf{v} T \mod M$ $= 2^{\ell} \mathbf{s} T + \boldsymbol{\delta} T \mod M$ T such that $UT = I_n \mod M$ $\omega - 2^{\ell} \mathbf{s} T = \boldsymbol{\delta} T \mod M$ Goal : Construct small \hat{T} such that $\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\hat{T}\|_{\infty} < M$


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


$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 3 \\ 2 & 4 \end{pmatrix} \text{ and}$$
$$\mathcal{L} = \{ \alpha M \mid \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}^2 \}$$







$$\mathbf{x}' = \lfloor \beta \rceil M = (-3, -1)$$



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


 β such that x= βM , $\beta = (-0.45, -1.55)$




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
$$\mathbf{x}' = \lfloor \beta \rceil M = (-2, 2)$$




I have $\mathbf{v} = \boldsymbol{\omega} U \mod M$ and $\mathbf{v} = 2^{\ell} \mathbf{s} + \boldsymbol{\delta}$ with $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ small



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


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We compute ω' as

 $\omega' U = \mathbf{v}' \mod M$

Why is ω' close to ω ?

$$(oldsymbol{\omega}-oldsymbol{\omega}')U=oldsymbol{v}-oldsymbol{v}' egin{array}{c} \mathsf{mod} & M \end{array}$$

$$(\boldsymbol{\omega}-\boldsymbol{\omega}')U=\mathbf{v}-\mathbf{v}' mode{} \operatorname{mod} M \quad \Leftrightarrow (\boldsymbol{\omega}-\boldsymbol{\omega}')=(\mathbf{v}-\mathbf{v}')\hat{\mathcal{T}} mode{} \operatorname{mod} M$$

$$(\omega - \omega')U = \mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}' \mod M \quad \Leftrightarrow (\omega - \omega') = (\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}')\hat{T} \mod M$$

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In KW case: $\| oldsymbol{\omega} - 2^\ell \mathbf{s} \hat{\mathcal{T}} \|_\infty \simeq \| \hat{\mathcal{T}} \|_\infty \| oldsymbol{\delta} \|_\infty$

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In KW case: $\|\boldsymbol{\omega} - 2^{\ell} \mathbf{s} \hat{\mathcal{T}}\|_{\infty} \simeq \|\hat{\mathcal{T}}\|_{\infty} \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_{\infty}$ But in our case $\|\boldsymbol{\omega} - \boldsymbol{\omega}'\|_{\infty} \ll \|\hat{\mathcal{T}}\|_{\infty} \|\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}'\|_{\infty}$, precisely $\|\boldsymbol{\omega} - \boldsymbol{\omega}'\|_{\infty} \le \|\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}'\|_{\infty}$

I already have
$$\|\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}'\|_{\infty} \leq 2^{\ell+1} \Leftarrow \|\boldsymbol{\omega} - \boldsymbol{\omega}'\|_{\infty} \leq \frac{2^{\ell+1}}{\|\boldsymbol{U}\|_{\infty}}$$
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If I call $\mathcal{L} = \{ \alpha U \mod M \mid \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}^n \}$, then

$$(\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{v}') \in \mathcal{A} = \mathcal{L} \cap B_{m,\infty}(2^{\ell+1})$$
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By (1), $\mathcal{B} \times U \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ and I want $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathcal{B} \times U$ We will show that $|\mathcal{B}| \ge |\mathcal{A}|$

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
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
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
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
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
$$|\mathcal{B}| = (2\lfloor \frac{2^{\ell+1}}{\|U\|_{\infty}} \rfloor - 1)^n$$














End of the attack

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For n = 32 and m = 40 we obtain $|\mathcal{B}| \ge |\mathcal{A}|$ for $\ell \le 14$.

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l	5	10	15	20	25
$\log_2(\ \omega-2^\ell \hat{T}\ _\infty)$	9.9	14.9	19.8	24.7	X
$\log_2(\ oldsymbol{\omega}-oldsymbol{\omega}'\ _\infty)$	3.6	8.7	13.6	18.7	X