

Ant routing for the Lightning Network (with C. Grunspan)

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Building on Bitcoin

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
- 1 Decentralized Networks
- 2 Lightning Network.
- 3 Biological ant routing
- 4 Basic ant routing for LN

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






Figure 1.1

Experimental setup for the double bridge experiment. (a) Branches have equal length. (b) Branches have different length. Modified from Goss et al. (1989).





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



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

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- Marking paths with pheromones.
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Thank for your attention!